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China’s farmland tenure, characterised by a household responsibility
system (HRS) and collective landownership, has contributed to the
continuation of poverty and natural resource deterioration in semi-
arid regions. Incongruent with local ecological, social and political
conditions, the HRS has been linked to rising social and political
tensions. Drawing on ethnographic research in Guyuan County, North
China, this paper provides peasants’ experiences of and views on the
land issue and examines the linkages between land tenure, poverty
and the governance of natural resources—grassland, forest land,
farmland and water. It shows that an appropriate land tenure system
can only be achieved if the fragmentation and individualization of the
HRS are reformed through an innovative institutional design. The paper
also contributes to a critical understanding of China’s agrarian reform
by articulating the need for land tenure diversity serving the overall
goal of sustainable land use and management and shaping sound state-
peasant relations.
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Introduction
Land desertification is one of the major en-
vironmental challenges to be faced by the Chine-
se government, at least if it seeks to achieve a
sustained and rapid economic growth through
tackling poverty and unsustainable natural resour-
ce use and management in vast regions of the
country. In Northen China, for instance, dust stor-
ms are affecting the capital city, Beijing, as well
as other major cities. Frequent occurrences of
dust storms in the agro-pastoral zone of that re-
gion affect the efficient use of farmlands and gras-
slands under semi-humid and semi-arid conditi-
ons. The management of land desertification has
become a major topic in the government’s envi-
ronmental agenda (WANG et al., 2005). This
region is also among the most affected by the
sharp reduction of cultivated land, posing a ma-
jor threat to the livelihoods of poor peasants (LIN
& HO, 2003).
Greening the region through ecological
construction is a major policy initiative of the
central government, seeking to drastically im-
prove the rural environment by enhancing the
vegetation cover (JIANG, 2006). However, this
effort is severely undermined by the adverse
effects of an economic development advancing
over natural resources, as most reform policies
have accelerated rural land degradation (WILLI-
AMS, 1996; MULDAVIN, 1997; SANDERS,
1999). It is argued that it is the local
government’s aggressive efforts to improve
grasslands and pastures that have caused this
failure, for they disregard the ecological pro-
cesses that characterise dry regions. By focu-
sing on greening or equating an ecological cons-
truction with intensive land-use practices, this
pursuit of short-term gains has met unintended
consequences (JIANG, 2006).
Furthermore, the organisation of ecologi-
cal construction is predicated on land tenure re-
form in the post-reform era, during which the
former commune was replaced by the Household
Responsibility System (HRS) in the early 1980s,
as seen across China. The HRS allows the distri-
bution of commune-held land and production
resources to households which are entitled to use
the resources for long periods by following the
rules of government, while landownership rema-
ins with the village collective. Farmland is often
distributed among households, and fencing or
enclosure of grassland for grass rehabilitation and
tree planting is used as a profound approach in
order to offer the households relevant incenti-
ves. This is done under the assumption that they
will have ample space to exercise their rights and
gain direct benefits (JIANG, 2006). This approa-
ch was practical and successful - to a limited de-
gree- in stimulating agricultural production. By
the mid-1980s, total agricultural output grew by
no less than 7.4 percent per year (HUANG, 1998).
Chinese peasants had enjoyed greater freedom
to sell surpluses after fulfilling obligatory grain
quotas as compared with the commune era.
Since 1985, China’s agricultural growth has
slowed down. Rural environmental degradation
and depletion of natural resources have made
many people fall back into poverty (LI et al.,
2005). Many scholars hold the assumption that
the both the retarded growth and the continuing
poverty are caused by the lack of clear-cut pri-
vate titles to land as farmland ownership remains
with the village collective. Such an institution is
often viewed as ambiguous in the light of the
mounting evidence of illegal land expropriation,
land conflicts and more importantly, unsustaina-
ble land use and management. Collective owner-
ship is often believed to obstruct the develop-
ment of a healthy rural land market, which is the
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key to the realization of economies of scale in
agricultural production and poverty reduction.
This two-tiered rural land system, which combi-
nes public ownership with private land use rights
is also prone to corruption and rent seeking by
local elites. To capitalize on the advantages of
the current HRS, some scholars have argued that
China would need a more individualistic institu-
tion that facilitates the development of tradable
land rights or a rural land market under the rule
of law (LAI, 1995; CAI, 2003; CHIN, 2005; also
see HO, 2005; SZIRMAI, 2005).
Bramall (2004) argues that one should not
overestimate the role of HRS in the Chinese agri-
cultural system. Rather, government interventi-
on, technological advancement and natural con-
ditions have played an even more important role.
The current small-size household farming system
has caused major problems. These include frag-
mentation of land, land lost to paths and bounda-
ries and conflicts over access to irrigation syste-
ms among village groups. Moreover, it makes
large-scale agricultural production extremely di-
fficult. Access to land has not been the basis for
China’s agricultural prosperity. Land is valuable
because of price support for agriculture rather
than for the efficiency of small-scale farms.
Transforming the HRS into a more indivi-
dualistic land tenure system may not provide a
viable solution. As Hu (1997, p. 175) points out,
the current land tenure system has encouraged
short-sighted decisions and the irresponsible use
of land resources by peasants. Peasants pursue
immediate and short-term gains, something that
is exacerbated by land fragmentation. The latter
hampers irrigation and drainage and leads to the
degradation of China’s agro-ecological environ-
ment. Local governments do not function effec-
tively in organising agricultural production and
overall rural development due to a lack of re-
sources and democratic governance. On the one
hand, the lack of resources and sound governan-
ce has hindered their role in sustainable rural
development. On the other hand, slow agricul-
tural development has generated insufficient re-
sources for local governments to deliver basic
rural services. Moreover, the Chinese peasantry,
to a large extent, has not been organised in a
way that their land can be better utilised and
managed. As a result, they have not managed to
gain substantial benefits from their land.
In semi-arid regions of China, the goal of
the government when applying the individua-
list land tenure reform of the HRS - averting
the tragedy of the commons (HARDIN, 1968)-
has not been met, as it is interwoven with com-
plex ecological, social and political conditions.
This paper sheds light on the current debates
described above and challenges any preconcei-
ved model of land tenure in an attempt to ex-
plain its linkages with natural resource gover-
nance and rural development. Moreover, it sho-
ws how the HRS actually fragments rural soci-
al and political relations. Drawing on the case
study of a nationally designated poverty-stri-
cken county, this paper also explores the un-
derlying institutional constraints, especially tho-
se concerning the major pitfalls of the HRS in
governing the use of land resources by the poor.
This people have seen their livelihoods become
more vulnerable to the degradation of grass-
lands, forestland and farmland. This paper also
describes the linkages of peasant livelihoods,
land-induced conflicts among different actors
and their contestations over resource utilisati-
on. It suggests the need for policy changes to
allow for peasants’ collective choice over more
appropriate land tenure systems contributing to
sustainable land use and poverty alleviation in
semi-arid regions of China.
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2. Ecological Conditions, Poverty and
Agricultural Policy Response
This case study is based on the fieldwork
conducted in Guyuan County, Hebei Province,
in 2008. The research methods were mainly qua-
litative, as it was extremely difficult to gather data
from household surveys and since published data
is scarce. I used participant observation as the
main tool to get closer to the interviewees and to
learn about their livelihoods and land use practi-
ces. However, most of the interviewees were re-
luctant to speak given the sensitivity of the rese-
arch topic. I still managed to gather the views of
30 informants from county and township gover-
nments and local peasants in 8 villages of slightly
different economic and natural conditions. The
field data was gathered from government reports
– both published and unpublished - as well as
from policy documents.
The mountainous Guyuan County of Hebei
Province has a total area of 3,654 square kilo-
metres and a population of 230,000, distributed
in 124 villages (see Map 1). Guyuan also falls
within the ecologically-strategic region under the
Three North Shelterbelt Programme aimed at
protecting China’s semi-arid and arid land from
degradation. The Chinese government started this
programme in 1978 with a plan to spend 40 billi-
on Yuan (1 US Dollar = 6.66 Yuan) over 70 ye-
ars in order to create 35 million hectares of hu-
man-made forest. Perhaps as the largest govern-
ment project to re-engineer the rural landscape
(JIANG, 2006, p. 1913), the programme also
envisaged preventing sand storms from entering
inner regions, such as Beijing. With an average
annual precipitation of 392.3 mm (WANG et al.,
2005, p. 2403), water shortage is a major cons-
traint to farming. Hebei, together with other pro-
vinces in North China, produces almost 25 per-
cent of China’s total agricultural output, althou-
gh it has at its disposal only 5 percent of the
county’s water resources. Irrigation is extensi-
vely used in agriculture (KAHRL et al., 2005, p.
13). A significant part of its soil is covered with
sparse vegetation as a result of salinisation and
alkalisation (WANG et al., 2005), although lar-
ge tracts of grassland and forests spread out in
certain parts.
Guyuan is highly prone to natural disasters
such as droughts, which affect an average of 30
percent of Guyuan’s farmlands. Economic deve-
Map 1.  Guyuan County, Hebei
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lopment has exacerbated this situation, as far-
mland, grassland and forests losses are rising.
Accordingly, the natural resource base, especi-
ally soil fertility and groundwater levels, has de-
clined dramatically. The local economy is cons-
trained by unsustainable natural resources use and
management. Poor access to public infrastructu-
re and technical services has led many peasants
to pursuit better farming and marketing options
for their production (GUYUAN COUNTY GO-
VERNMENT, 2003, p. 97).
Guyuan features a combined economy of
cultivated farming, animal husbandry and tourism,
while the presence of industries remains minimal
due to its various natural and infrastructural cons-
traints. With an average of 0.43 ha of arable land
per capita, it has been a nationally designated
priority poor county since 1994. A total of 124
villages, with a population of 93,069, or over 40
percent of the total population of the county, are
targeted for poverty alleviation. Despite the pro-
gresses made in the promotion of large-scale ve-
getable farming since 1998, there are still 78,600
people living on an average annual net income of
100 US Dollars or so. Poverty reduction conti-
nues to be a major task of the county govern-
ment (GUYUAN COUNTY POVERTY ALLE-
VIATION OFFICE, 2007).
Since 1998, the county government has
spearheaded the development of agribusiness
enterprises on the assumption that this trajectory
would enable different villages to develop their
economies of scales. Animal husbandry and ve-
getable farming have been promoted as the most
important enterprises for poverty reduction. It
has become a well-known region for the supply
of milk, beef and vegetables to other parts of the
country, especially the North. In 2007, for exam-
ple, 80 percent of the villages or 40 percent of
the population were involved in vegetable far-
ming, using 15 percent of the arable land
(GUYUAN POVERTY ALLEVIATION OFFI-
CE, 2007).
In comparison, cash crop farming in the
county was minimal before 1998. Traditional
crops such as oat and flax were widely planted
for both domestic use and the market, with tiny
profits. Paradoxically, these crops are more re-
sistant to droughts than other vegetables. The
introduction of the latter was assumed to be a
quick fix to prolonged poverty, yet the extent to
which poverty has been reduced is limited. Whi-
le peasants shifted their traditional farming to the
“modern” forms, the majority of them have not
benefited from this switch. Natural disasters,
water shortage and a lack of collective organisa-
tion of the farmers, constrain peasants’ efforts to
maximize farming efficiency and market access.
Both the county’s government and the peasants
have voiced their concerns about the sustainabi-
lity of the current farming methods in the light of
these challenges. Above all, the peasants’ lack of
information about the market conditions and on
off-farming employment opportunities has fur-
ther complicated their already difficult livelihoo-
ds.
3. Changing Land Relations: From
Mutual Help to Conflict
Understanding the history of land tenure
reform is important for the analysis of changing
land relations, which are central to rural develo-
pment and to the governance of natural resour-
ces and village affairs. In fact, land reform in
Guyuan differed little from the rest of the coun-
try. Before 1949, most agricultural land in this
region was owned by landlords, rich peasants and
merchants. Ordinary peasants owned little or no
land at all. Only a small number of poor peasants
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managed to become smallholders after many ye-
ars of hard work and savings. The land occupati-
on ratio of the rich to the poor was nearly 8:1—
an indicator of a high level of social and econo-
mic inequality. The majority of the peasants ma-
intained their livelihoods through renting the land
of the landlords and rich peasants. Land transac-
tions took different forms, which included land
leases, sales, mortgages and the hiring of farm
workers by the landowners.
The land revolution led by the Communist
Party called for the abolition of the exploitive
feudal land relations with the goal of uniting the
poor peasantry in order to overthrow the Natio-
nalist government. Many landlords’ landed pro-
perties were confiscated and redistributed to the
poor peasants. This victory faced an immediate
challenge for agricultural development, since it
was a drastic process of severing the old pro-
ductive relations. Peasants who received redis-
tributed land could hardly cope with the shorta-
ge of labour, livestock and machinery, all essen-
tial to efficient farming. Peasant cooperation be-
came a necessary institution to deal with these
problems. After 1950, many temporary and year-
round mutual help groups based on voluntary
principles were established. These groups with
varying numbers of participant households played
an important role in offsetting the shortage of
human and technical capital through the exchan-
ge of labour, livestock and equipment. During
this period, the number of mutual help groups
increased substantially. For instance, in 1950, only
2.8 percent of the households were involved; in
1954, this number reached 81.7 percent
(GUYUAN COUNTY GOVERNMENT, 2003,
p. 197).
The establishment of peasant production
organisations would not have been easy without
government dominance and intervention. Their
transformation went through three stages. At the
first stage, in 1952, primary agricultural coope-
ratives were piloted and established along the
whole county. Individual households remained as
the landowners, but also as cooperative mem-
bers to receive the benefits based on their labour
contribution. Land use, management and agri-
cultural production were all arranged by the co-
operatives. As the second stage started in 1956,
the primary cooperatives and earlier established
mutual help groups were transformed into ad-
vanced agricultural cooperatives. Collective lan-
downership replaced the old private ownership.
All peasant households automatically became
members of the cooperatives, which arranged
farming and distributed production materials to
the members. At the third stage, these cooperati-
ves were transformed into communes—a larger
institution displaying collective ownership of lan-
ded resources. Underscored by a high-level of
planning and bureaucracy, the communes quickly
showed to be ineffective in accomplishing  far-
ming organisation and rural development. The
local government attempted to improve their effi-
ciency, but it did not provide incentives to the
members to stimulate agricultural production.
Yet, this failure did not fully lie in the commune
itself. The Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), as
characterised by fierce political struggles, con-
tributed to the destruction of social and econo-
mic relations at all levels, which obstructed and
did not leave space for further development of
the communes (GUYUAN COUNTY GOVER-
NMENT, 2003).
In Guyuan County, the HRS was first in-
troduced in 1979 in some pilot villages. This in-
troduction proved to be very difficult. As it had
happened with the previous policies on the mo-
dels of cooperatives and communes, its adopti-
on was performed through strong administrative
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measures and without full peasant consent. Land,
labour, livestock and equipment were allocated
to individual households, which were given the
responsibility to meet production and other eco-
nomic quota and taxes set by the local govern-
ment. It was expected that the HRS would pro-
vide peasants with more incentives to cultivate
their land, but the outcomes have not been pro-
minent with regards to poverty levels and natu-
ral resources degradation. Moreover, from the
very beginning the HRS cultivated the seeds of
inequality, as large farms were leased to the so-
called capable households. During the 1970s and
1980s, these farms were run with a huge loss of
profits and property due to mismanagement and
to weak governance. They were thus returned to
collective management. In 1993, the whole coun-
ty followed the call of the central government to
stabilize and improve farmlands, contracting re-
lations by granting 30 years of land use rights to
the households. And in 1997, a second round of
farmland leasing was carried out with the pers-
pective of clarifying and documenting land con-
tracting rights and improving land tenure securi-
ty. The latter was assumed to be important for
the stabilization of land relations and for foste-
ring land use rights transfers among the househol-
ds, as some peasants would prefer leasing their
land to others and undertake off-farm employ-
ment (GUYUAN COUNTY GOVERNMENT,
2003). In short, the egalitarian principle and prac-
tice concerning agriculture gradually receded
with the introduction of the HRS, whose align-
ment with state policies on agricultural output to
be met by households does not always suit the
peasants’ need for better living conditions and
access to social services (CHANG, 1994).
The practice of farmland leasing quickly
triggered land conflicts among contractors, vi-
llage collectives and local government after 1997.
Affected peasants lack the power to hold the lo-
cal government accountable and to negotiate ter-
ms of conditions with it. Village collectives are
sometimes accused of mishandling of land allo-
cations. Those households with close relati-
onships with the village leaders sometimes re-
ceive more and better quality of land than the
others and even do not fully comply with their
contractual terms. In some cases, the land of those
who have migrated to cities is intentionally kept
and redistributed to others. In the event of the
migrants returning to their homes when they were
unable to find a permanent stay in the cities, they
found that their land had been taken away. This
is the most critical factor for disputes and con-
flicts between peasants and village leaders.1
Obviously, how to manage appropriate land
use for the benefit of the poor presents a daun-
ting challenge for local governance. This chal-
lenge also exhibits the weakness of the HRS in
securing peasants’ land use rights. This historical
account shows that none of the land tenure regi-
mes have worked effectively. Rather, they have
undermined the power of the poor and led to ri-
sing social inequality and conflicts in the coun-
tryside as will be discussed in the following sec-
tions.
4. Fallacies of Land Law and Policy
4.1 The Grassland Enclosure Policy
Following the overall goal of the Chinese
government in practicing the scientific develop-
ment concept that emphasises human-nature har-
mony, Guyuan is listed in the provincial and nati-
onal ecological construction plan. The optimi-
sed use of its fragile natural resources, such as
grasslands, has become a primary goal of the
county government. A major highlight of this goal
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is to roll out the grassland enclosure and animal
husbandry prohibition policy, as the carrying ca-
pacity of the grassland is claimed to have rea-
ched the lowest level beyond government con-
trol. In this regard, the local government deter-
mines to ban the traditional method of grazing,
deemed to be disorganized and attributable to
the tragedy of the commons. Moreover, this
policy represents a major move towards the im-
plementation of the 2002 Grassland Law of Chi-
na that sets a strong mandate for local govern-
ments to properly preserve grasslands. This law
stipulates that the ownership of grasslands rests
with the state, which allocates use rights to the
village collective. The latter is allowed to lease
the land to individual households. In particular,
Article 33 of the Grassland Law states the follo-
wing:
Contractors for grassland management
shall make rational use of grasslands, and
they may not exceed the stock-carrying
capacity verified by the competent admi-
nistrative department for grasslands; they
shall take such measures as growing and
reserving forage grass and fodder…in or-
der to keep the balance between grass yi-
eld and the number of livestock raised (GO-
VERNMENT OF CHINA, 2002, p. 7).
This law reflects the government’s call for
the arbitrary management of grasslands in use
of the carrying capacity concept. It marks no
difference from the 2002 Rural Land Contrac-
ting Law in terms of granting land use rights to
individual households. Accordingly, a large part
of grasslands in Guyuan has been partly contrac-
ted out to individual households who are requi-
red to sign their use rights contracts with the
county Agricultural and Animal Husbandry Bu-
reau. In principle, their grazing rights are set
against the numbers of livestock to be kept by
them, which is hard to implement. In practice,
the delimitation of household-based grassland will
automatically lead to the reduction of the num-
ber of livestock. This measure is assumed to be
useful for the preservation of the land, for which
peasant users should bear responsibility. In a few
cases, some grassland areas are kept on the han-
ds of the village collective purely for the purpose
of nature conservation. Such areas -usually de-
pleted or prone to increasing levels of degradati-
on- are fenced off for rehabilitation. Apart from
the contracted and preserved grasslands, there is
only a small proportion of the land left open to
communal grazing.
To the local government, the administrati-
on of grassland protection is too costly and diffi-
cult to manage, since the peasants can find ways
to cut the fence and enter the prohibited areas.
The grassland contract management has not suc-
ceeded in fully registering the peasants, some of
whom have not applied for the contract certifica-
te as required by law. For those who have the
certificates, they are only allowed to graze ap-
propriate numbers of livestock; but in practice,
one can hardly tell whether these numbers have
been followed. Furthermore, there is a lack of
institutional mechanisms for effective monitoring
as county and township governments and the vi-
llage collective do not have clear roles to play
and thus do not think that they are solely respon-
sible for it. They often blame each other for this
rather than putting forward more coherent poli-
cies for sustainable land management.
The ineffectiveness of the law in the view
of the local government is due to peasants’ lack
of “modern knowledge” of livestock rearing and
grazing. To influence peasants’ grazing behaviour
on the basis of ecological science (see JIANG,
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2006), further attempt was made to introduce
new methods to prevent the peasants from gra-
zing outside their homes. However, as these
methods require improvements in the use of fod-
der and feed, it was too costly for the peasants to
follow. The peasants have continued to ignore
these calls and managed to avoid the inspection
of the local bureau staff regarding the use of the
grassland. Some rehabilitated sites, despite being
well protected for some time, have now become
degraded again due to a peasant “invasion”. Some
large parcels of grassland contracted out were
found to be used for cropping and other functi-
ons, which were not allowed by law. Nonethe-
less, with the implementation of the 2003 De-
cree of Grazing Prohibition, access to grazing
has become more and more difficult for the pea-
sants, who complained that their income from
farmland cultivation was so limited that they had
to rely on grazing to supplement it. The lack of
adequate access to grassland further contributes
to their vulnerable livelihoods (XINHUA NET,
2006).
The widespread grassland degradation in-
dicates that relevant grassland laws and policies
place overt emphasis on management issues ra-
ther than linking it with viable options for pea-
sant livelihoods. To the peasants, the traditional
method of grazing has certain cost-effective ad-
vantages, including flexible management of the
livestock. As their own grazing rules are not con-
sidered by the government, they do not believe
that the “exotic” method of grassland enclosure
is in their best interests. In fact, as in other regi-
ons, grassland enclosure has contributed to over-
grazing and thus land degradation (JIANG, 2006).
Furthermore, when there is not much leeway for
them to use even their own contracted grassland
as it is small in size, grazing on the preserved
grassland becomes unavoidable. For instance, 95
percent of the informants acknowledged that they
knew what was happening, but did not know how
to deal with it. The rest simply did not believe
that they themselves should be blamed. Above
all, they saw livestock husbandry as a better way
to fight poverty than other practices such as ve-
getable farming. And when they saw the imme-
diate benefits from it, they simply wanted to for-
go other scarce options.
The lack of effectiveness of policy instru-
ments indicates that as in many other parts of the
country grassland preservation programmes are
not coupled with appropriate poverty alleviation
strategies. Moreover, no community-based land
management models based on household tenure
are found (see BANKS et al, 2003). In Guyuan,
grazing remains as the most profitable means of
livelihoods for the majority poor, as they cannot
rely upon farmland production due to environ-
mental and economic constraints as seen in later
discussions. They showed discontent over the
county government’s grassland reclamation po-
licy which caused an increase in poverty and ri-
sing social conflicts in the village (Xinhua Net,
2006). Their views on participation in grassland
use and management have not been at the top of
the development agenda of the local government.
Furthermore, grassland management is of-
ten arguably compounded by the fuzziness of the
heterogeneous and hybrid property relations,
where village collectives and even local govern-
ments have more power to determine land uses
than the peasants, and where lines of responsibi-
lity of grassland management are not clearly de-
marcated among different state and non-state
actors (see HINTON, 1990; YEH, 2004). These
factors contribute to poor grassland governan-
ce, which has had a direct impact on the percep-
tions of the peasants regarding grassland use. A
prominent example is the Ministry of
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Agriculture’s national circular in 2006 on its de-
cision to penalize the misconduct of Guyuan lo-
cal government staff and land contractors in gras-
sland use.2 It was reported that the county go-
vernment and a village committee had contrac-
ted the land owned by the government and villa-
ge collective respectively to local businessman
and certain peasant households without transpa-
rent procedures made known to the local com-
munity. The latter had no idea of how local go-
vernment line agencies played a key role or were
involved. This led to the conversion of large pie-
ces of the grassland into other land usages. Ac-
cording to the 2002 Grassland Law of China, land
contractors must maintain the original status of
the land. In the two reported cases they mana-
ged to cover up their purposes by stating that
they wanted the land for eco-tourism develop-
ment and would take care of the land to abide by
the law. Only at a very late stage did the local
community notice that they had changed large
plots of land into cropland and fenced these parts
off from the rest of the community. In fact, the
two contractors even occupied the land before
the local bureaus formally approved their appli-
cations (Ministry of Agriculture, 2006). This
means that to a certain extent, the current tenure
system has favored the powerful groups in their
uses of the land for their own benefits, which is
commonly found in other parts of China.
4.2 Collective forestry reform
Tree plantation and preservation are regar-
ded as equally crucial as grassland preservation
to ecological restoration. The county government
has made the forest a fundamental natural resour-
ce to be preserved and to be free from illegal
logging by establishing forest protection teams
in each township. To a large extent, their measu-
res have been effective in this respect. But the
peasants are not offered strong incentives in any
of the forest plantation programmes. For instan-
ce, the most prominent land conversion or “gre-
en for grain” programme aimed at dramatically
increasing forest coverage to combat soil erosi-
on and flooding3, as in the other parts of the coun-
try, has proved to be unsuccessful due to many
factors, one of which is a lack of linkages betwe-
en tree planting and its derived benefits. For ins-
tance, in recent years peasants received only an
estimate of 160 Yuan annually per mu (1 ha = 15
mu) of their land converted to forest land. And
this included both compensation and a subsidy
from the local government. This tiny amount was
just impossible for the peasants to maintain their
livelihoods when their land was devoted to fo-
rests. Given the climatic conditions in this dry
region, it takes approximately 15 years for the
trees to grow. Also, the planted trees had not been
well cared for, and some even died off a few ye-
ars later. Furthermore, as reflected by the county
Forestry Bureau, peasants’ lack of ownership
over the trees put the sustainability of the forest
programme at risk. This also applies to those trees
under the direct management of the village col-
lective. In the end, this programme was suspen-
ded. Obviously, balancing the interests of the lo-
cal government and peasants in this sector poses
a difficult challenge to decision-makers (see
STRAUSS, 2009).
To address disincentives and to encourage
the peasants to take an interest in the forest land,
the Forestry Bureau follows the example of the
collective forestry tenure reform in southern
China, where cases of success are documented.4
In fact, this initiative adopted elsewhere was taken
up by the State Council, which promulgated the
2008 Opinions on Comprehensive Collective
Forest Land Tenure Reform. Essentially, this po-
licy is to emulate the HRS in the management of
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collective forestry land and peasants’ ownership
of forests across the country. It is seen as a major
measure to boost the enthusiasm of the peasants,
increase their incomes and make forestry sustai-
nable. It stipulates that production and manage-
ment of forestry should be entrusted to peasants
by issuing extendable 70-year forest land use con-
tracts, while the nature of collective ownership
should be maintained. It calls for ensuring equal
access to peasants’ forestry land rights and gua-
ranteeing their rights to know and participate in
the decision-making process affecting their land
rights. Moreover, peasants are allowed to trans-
fer, lease or mortgage the forest land use rights
within the tenure period. Local government is
asked to extend financial institutional services to
the needy and establish forestry insurance to pro-
tect the peasants from natural disasters. This re-
form also makes an explicit call for strengthening
public services to support forestry cooperatives
and enterprises, which should play a leading role
in forest management and production to promote
economies of scale. It is set to be completed over
a 5-year period, during which forest land rights
certificates should be issued to the individual hou-
seholds based on the registration of their contrac-
ted forest land (Government of China, 2008; Xi-
nhua News Agency, 2008).
In fact, long before the promulgation of this
policy, the Forestry Bureau had tried to emulate
similar measures to undertake collective forestry
reform — with very limited success. The slogan
of strengthening individual households’ awareness
and forest management ownership was used to
rationalize the policy and to motivate the peasants.
However, the latter did not perceive this policy as
something new, as the forest had already been
under the management of the collective. Moreo-
ver, granting long-term use rights might incur more
institutional burdens to shoulder for the househol-
ds, since they do not expect to gain benefits from
the forest products which are not as marketable
as in the past. As a staff member of the bureau
indicated,
The collective forestry reform here can-
not be compared with that of the South,
where the peasants can simultaneously
plant other economic crops with the fo-
rest. Here, the climatic conditions just can-
not allow this. That is why it is not attrac-
tive to the peasants. So, we may not be
able to continue the reform later on (Inter-
view, July 2008).
While the use rights for a large proportion
of the collective forests were said to be granted
to individual households, the latter were reluc-
tant to receive the use rights certificates. How
to divide and redistribute the collective forests
to individual households is never an easy task
for the Forestry Bureau. To a large extent, the
forest land is supposed to be redistributed to
the peasants on the basis of equitable conditi-
ons in terms of the quality of the land and the
number of household members. In cases where
the land with poor quality cannot be redistribu-
ted easily, it should be done through lease, ten-
der and auction to the needy. When this cannot
be realized, it rests with the village collective.
All these steps require sound planning and par-
ticipation of the community in deciding on how
the forest land can best be used and managed.
Moreover, the peasants need to know whether
the forests contracted to them are of economic
value to them. Otherwise, they will lose interest
in it (BAI, 2007). The lessons from this county
and other regions indicate that in most cases,
local governments pay insufficient attention to
the needs of the households and collective efforts
(MIAO & WEST, 2004). As a result, the re-
form can easily incur discontent and even con-
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flicts among various stakeholders involved, whi-
ch deserves further studies.
The lack of capacity of the Forestry Bu-
reau to control inappropriate forest land use
overshadows its overall forestry reform agen-
da. Some staff blamed grazing as the number
one threat to forestry and emphasized the need
to put a complete stop to it by severely penali-
zing those responsible especially the househol-
ds with a big number of livestock. Obviously, a
lack of coordination between different line agen-
cies constrains any conceived efforts in sustai-
nable forest land management. These factors are
compounded in the ongoing process of forest
decentralization, where local government lacks
resources and capacity to implement the reform
agenda (see LIEBERTHAL & LAMPTON,
1992). What mechanisms should be established
to empower the peasants to keep the local ca-
dres in check remain unclear. As a result, “the
leadership of the rural collective, including the
Party secretary, the village head and other villa-
ge committee members, may co-operate and
pursue personals interests as a collective” (CAI,
2003, p. 668).
In short, policies of grassland and forest
protection and utilization have been mutually
exclusive. The local peasants could only resort
to short-term gains, sometimes at the cost of these
resources (CAI & WANG, 2006). A lack of co-
ordination in land use planning and management
contributes to the failure of the programmes in
which the peasants are caught in a vortex of un-
certainty regarding the changes in land use im-
posed by the government. The relationships be-
tween natural resource tenure reform, poverty
and the environment have not been sufficiently
addressed in an integrated manner by the local
government. The reform of land resource tenure
from collective to household-based institutions
signifies a simplistic approach that departs from
the biophysical, economic and political cons-
traints.
5. Farmland Use, Conflicting
Interests and Peasant Contestations
5.1 Farmland for Livelihoods
Rural development for local peasants is
nothing more than the maximization of the utili-
zation of the available resources in the pursuit of
quick results in the reduction of poverty. Their
attachment to land, pasture, forests and other
resources embodies their pragmatic values towar-
ds their livelihoods. Yet, peasant relations have
become less dynamic than the commune period
in the 1960s and those found in traditional ethnic
minority groups. With the market-oriented poli-
cies infiltrating their communities, individual in-
terests override the mechanisms of collective
choice and decision-making on the use of the
resources for the benefit of all. This can be seen
in the cases of farmland use more clearly.
Vegetable farming constitutes a primary
source of income for most households in areas
where soil conditions are favorable, although the
increasing level of water scarcity has becoming a
problem. It requires reasonable capital inputs in
terms of time spent in the field, use of water, che-
mical fertilizers and seeds. Where there is a lack
of technical and funding services provided by the
local government, the growers are vulnerable to
and incapable of effectively dealing with various
natural and economic risks. The varieties of ve-
getables grown are limited across the county, and
this unavoidably leads to competition over sales
and marketing outlets. Only those households
with relatively larger sizes of land manage to gain
reasonable profits. Since they have no other ways
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to sell their produce than relying on the middle-
men from other provinces to collect it, quite of-
ten they are in a weak position to bargain over
the prices offered.
With the introduction of the HRS, random
growing of vegetables for the peasants to gain
high economic returns has replaced traditional
cropping to a large extent; as a result, grain pro-
duction has reduced substantially. In China, be-
tween 1995 and 2001, the production of vegeta-
bles nearly doubled (LITCHTENBERG & DING,
2008). In Guyuan, farmland fragmentation has
reduced the efficiency of farming as evident in
vegetable farming, which is akin to “digging the
soil and land without caring about the kind of
resources they will leave for the future” (HU,
1997; ZEN, 1991, p. 79).
Village life is unlike the past, when unity
and mutual help played an essential role in or-
ganising the peasants. “Everyone is helping hi-
mself. We do not know about the future — we
just try to make ends meet anyway. Nobody will
help us”, some peasants claimed. Similar rema-
rks were also shared by the local government
staff. Despite the HRS’ partial success in po-
verty reduction, it displays an increasing weak-
ness in uniting the poor as land becomes frag-
mented. The peasants have less space for the
social organisation of agricultural production.
And when the village collective mostly repre-
sents the interests of the local state, the role of
the peasants in voicing their concerns over land
use and agricultural development becomes mi-
nimal. As a result, land is nothing but a means
of livelihoods for the peasants. All the informants
agreed that they were not sure what farming
relations in their villages exist as they worked
on the land on their own. When their land use
contracts expire in 30 years, they wondered
whether their land rights would be altered by
the local government. Facing uncertainty over
land use and other associated rights and a lack
of public support, many informants viewed the
Chinese peasantry as the most vulnerable group
in the country. These institutional constraints
pose severe challenges for the sustainability of
farmland use in the county.
5.2 Conflicting Interests in Farmland Use
Fragmented farmland use caused largely by
the introduction of the HRS underpins complex
peasant-local state relations as both have diffe-
rent or even conflicting interests in the land. As
the value of the land increases with the local go-
vernment gaining increasing control over it, lo-
cal peasants see their land as their last resort to
maintain their livelihoods.
The national policy on farmland protection
places strict conditions on farmland use and pro-
hibits its conversion into non-agricultural uses.
Accordingly, the local government set the man-
dates for the village collective to demolish all the
buildings such as pigpens in the field. And pea-
sants’ ignorance of this call would lead to forced
demolition of their properties. However, when
the peasants built their houses years ago, they
were not informed of whether it would contra-
vene any government policies. In fact, their ide-
as were even approved by the village collective.
As these households are small in scale and only
occupy the tiny plots unsuitable for cropping, thus
literally, this act has nothing to do with farmland
conversion. Seeking the support of the village
committees was futile. As many of them are wo-
men, children and the elderly left behind in the
village, they could not form a unified force against
possible land evictions. They also knew that the
peasants’ weakness had led to the eviction of
many of them as new land development takes
place on a regular basis.
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This example also reflects that land use plan-
ning and management has never been an easy task
for the local government which has been under
mounting pressure to both preserve and utilize
the land to promote economic development. The
county does not have any foreign companies ope-
rating in it now. To attract business development,
when conditions allow, the local government must
provide the necessary basic infrastructure, and
this requires a huge amount of funds to be allo-
cated. However, this is extremely difficult for this
nationally-designated poor county. Thus, the ac-
quisition and consolidation of land has become a
necessity in favour of corporations and real esta-
te developers. While creating space for this de-
velopment, the local government has to restrict
the use of farmland for “non-agricultural” pur-
poses by the peasants in order to strike the ove-
rall balance between farmland preservation and
conversion.
The county government line agencies are
trapped on the path towards economies of sca-
le in agricultural production, making the ma-
ximization of land use and land acquisition
unavoidably difficult for them. They all see-
med to agree that the county had no other
options but to introduce the “dragon head”
agribusiness (longtou qiye) to take the lead
in organizing scaled production. They com-
plained about the peasants’ backwardness of
ideas, knowledge and skills in adjusting to the
demands of the market economy. However,
for the peasants, the lack of secure land ri-
ghts and the mechanisms for transparent and
effective partnership with agribusinesses
could only make them cast doubt on every
land use arrangements. As the local govern-
ment has the mandate to push further ahead
economic development, its conflicting inte-
rests with the peasants are on the rise.
The dilemma for sustainable rural develo-
pment may indicate the need to reorganize the
peasants who can collectively decide on how
their land and other resources can be used pro-
perly. This is also a prerequisite for the healthy
growth of agribusinesses. Like those pilot sche-
mes taking place in southern China, the county
line agencies staff pointed out that they should
allow the peasants to become land shareholders
and benefit from agribusinesses.5 Thus, the vi-
llage collective should play a bigger role in uni-
ting the peasants and assuring them better eco-
nomic returns on agricultural production. Ulti-
mately, this requires the establishment of speci-
alized business-oriented peasant associations.
However, the current policy on these organiza-
tions requires a substantial amount of capital to
be registered, and this would simply mean that
for the poor peasants it is impossible. Moreo-
ver, the rural societal structure is fragmented
and it is extremely difficult to bring the peasants
together. This also demonstrates the failure of
the village collective and government policy
in revitalizing the social and political dynamics
of the Chinese countryside since the market
reform of the late 1970s. Nearly 50 percent of
the local government staff held the view that
the trend of the rural economic reform should
reverse the HRS into genuine collective land
use and management. And this was thought to
be a way to revitalize the Chinese countryside
and help the peasants cope with their vulnera-
bilities to various social, political, economic
and natural risks associated with land use.
However, how to convince the peasants and
give them an incentive to form relevant agri-
business groups or associations remains a chal-
lenge, for these associations may become the
cause of conflicting interests rather than re-
presenting collective efforts.
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5.3 Peasants’ Contestations of Farmland Use
The scale of peasants’ self-organisation
of economic, social and political activities is
rather limited due to the institutional cons-
traints as already mentioned. But they are not
passive recipients of government laws and po-
licies. Changes in the central government poli-
cy that favours agriculture, on the one hand,
have created more incentives for the peasants
to care about their land; on the other hand, they
also spur local conflicts. Land-induced conflicts
between the peasants and local cadres have be-
come a thorny matter. A recurring example is
the tension between returning peasant migrants
and local carders over land reallocation. Villa-
ge collectives and township governments are
often complained of purposely reallocating the
land when the original legal users migrate to
the cities. In this case, Guyuan resembles the
rest of the country, where large numbers of im-
poverished rural people have become migrants
as part of the “floating population” of 200 mi-
llion to seek temporary work in cities (ZHANG,
2001; SOLINGER, 2002). To the township go-
vernment, the land left by these migrants should
be redistributed to accommodate the needs of
other groups. Paradoxically, this practice is no
longer permitted by law that aims to ensure
land tenure security and explicitly calls for an
end to land readjustments.6 As one member of
the local township government staff remarked,
The current land law and policy do not
really take into account the local conditi-
ons seriously. And it is sometimes con-
tradictory in terms. For instance, it enshri-
nes women’s land rights. But if land re-
adjustments are not allowed, how can we
give land to the women who marry men
in our villages? Besides this, the recent
agricultural policies have actually exten-
ded the invitation to the migrants who
want to return to farming. When they mi-
grated to cities, they left their land idle
and let us manage it. We then leased it to
others who could farm the land. How can
we return this land to them when it is in
others’ hands? Their discontent with us
has led to skyrocketing cases of petitions,
but we find it hard to meet their demands
(interview, July 2008).
These conflicts do not indicate that local
peasants have more systemic concerns over
how their land can be utilized in a sustainable
way. Yet these conflicts show the peasants’ gro-
wing concerns about their rights, livelihoods
and ineffective policies in the context of wide-
ning social inequality between different groups.
As a result, land readjustments may privilege
some while marginalising others due to the
practice of personalism, clientelism and ne-
tworking tactics carried out by the dominant
group (see NONINI, 2008). Moreover, pea-
sants’ struggles for land use are sporadic and
seldom organised systematically in terms of the
creation of effective groups that can maximize
their influence and collective force. This may
indicate that the current HRS is inextricably
linked to this, with its nature of fragmentation of
agricultural production as well as social cohesi-
on. Paradoxically, 90 percent of the interviewees
indicated that they would rather keep the HRS,
as they did not trust the collective. The rest ei-
ther preferred the old commune system or sim-
ply had no preferences. But they all thought that
development policies and laws concerning their
land rights should be strengthened. Some even
expressed their inclination towards land privati-
sation, which would ideally enshrine more secu-
re rights for the peasants. But all of them expres-
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sed their concerns about the absence of viable pro-
perty relations for sustainable land use and mana-
gement and poverty alleviation as a whole.
6. Conclusions
This study indicates that the conventional
individualistic approach to land resource tenure
has not brought viable solutions to the comple-
xity of rural poverty and its underlying instituti-
onal constraints. Relying on market-oriented de-
velopment models, China’s economic success has
incurred in severe social and environmental costs.
To a certain extent, the replacement of the col-
lective institution of the commune with the HRS
has exacerbated its developmental dilemma. The
serious flaws of this approach and the rhetoric of
development policies are not responsive to local
biophysical, political and economic realities
(GUPTA, 1998). The HRS is attributable to
short-term development gains rather than sus-
tainable resource use in the long run. Moreover,
it is interwoven with the absence of appropriate
institutional mechanisms for effective sustaina-
ble land use and management in a region where
poverty and natural resource degradation prevail.
The HRS has been a contributing factor for
the fragmentation of social relations and the lack
of capacity of the local state and lack of collecti-
ve action of local community in development
processes. The local state puts overt emphasis
on meeting higher-level state demands rather than
serving the community needs first (CHRISTIAN-
SEN & ZHANG, 1998; KUNG, et al, 2009). This
is reinforced by the HRS whereby communities
are marginalized in land use planning and broa-
der-level of village governance. In the context of
rising social inequality across the country, it be-
comes more difficult for the state to organize the
peasantry. The fact that some peasants support
the HRS actually implies that they mistrust other
possible measures imposed upon them by the sta-
te. In other words, they are not given the space
to explore other systems of land tenure by the
state.
It is important to understand how mecha-
nisms of power have been able to function wi-
thin the society and between society and state in
order to investigate the agents responsible for
social constructs (FOUCAULT, 1986). In this
sense, this case study shows that although me-
chanisms for peasants’ collective action remain
unclear and even weak, their daily struggles are
omnipresent in their disorganized and silent con-
testations. However, their resistance is not “ge-
nuine” in the sense of being organized with clear
motives and goals as defined by Scott (1985).
This individually-based and seemingly passive
resistance to the land use institutions reveals the
absence of the mechanisms for genuine peasant
participation in policy-making processes concer-
ning their land use and governance.
As the peasant-local state relations beco-
me more murky and complex, and social dyna-
mics among different social groups become more
intractable, how to revitalise the Chinese coun-
tryside by making the complex social, political
and economic relationships work for the goal of
sustainable land use and rural development re-
mains an ultimate challenge for policy-makers.
They need to rethink their current institutions
governing farmland use and natural resource
management. It is essential to tackle the structu-
ral barriers to law and policy-making mechanis-
ms that put constraints on the representation of
the peasants whose need to participate in the pro-
cess should be nurtured and empowered (CAI,
2003; LI, et al, 2004).
No single type of landownership is a blue-
print for sustainable land use and management
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(DIETZ, et al., 2003). A new form of land tenure
congruent with local economic, ecological, poli-
tical and social conditions should be explored and
tested by policy-makers. This form of land tenu-
re has to serve the needs of sustainable land use
and management, which is largely impinged on
state-peasant relations. In retrospect, these com-
plex relations are shaped by land tenure arrange-
ments. Thus, future land policy developments
should be based on sound analyses of the inter-
connections between land tenure, land use and
management and socio-political relations, the
implications of which are critical for China’s tran-
sition to ensure the accomplishment of sustaina-
ble development goals in semi-arid regions in
particular.
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